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A B S T R A C T
Previous studies divide the former Soviet Central Asian countries (CACs) into ‘‘more open’’ (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan) and ‘‘more isolationist’’ (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) depending on their
trade-to-GDP ratio. We investigate this by gravity analysis measuring contributions of country-speciﬁc
properties and networking factors in 185 bilateral CACs trade ﬂows over the period 1995–2011. Our
ﬁndings suggest that while all CACs have experienced growing trade over the period, they show
considerable variety in initial conditions and transition reforms. The more isolationist countries have
mostly relied on fortuitous factors such as hikes in natural resource prices to boost their trade, whereas
the more open, reform-minded states have achieved considerable trade growth through reducing trade
costs. Being an open or isolationist economy has resulted, respectively, in more or less suitable
environment for business and investment.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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While much of the literature on post-Soviet transition has
focused on the experiences of the countries in Central and Eastern
Europe and the Russian Federation, the Central Asian countries
(CACs) have received relatively less attention2. There is no study
focusing on the trade determinants and performance of CACs, even
though it has been recognised that there is a strong correlation
between success in transition from plan to market and foreign
trade performance (Kaminski, Wang, & Winters, 1996). In addition,
the international business (IB) literature has not paid enough
attention to the developments in Central Asia after the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union and there is no study focusing on the
business environment in CACs and their trade performance3.* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 2084114263.
E-mail address: m.rizov@mdx.ac.uk (M. Rizov).
1 The paper draws heavily on Arman Mazhikeyev’s doctoral research; neverthe-
less, the authors’ contributions to this paper are equal.
2 Some notable exceptions are Rumer (1995, 2000a, 200b), Pomfret (2000, 2003),
Burghart and Sabonis-Helf (2004), Starr (2004), Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik
(2005), Dowling and Wignaraja (2005, 2006), and UNDP (2005) which focus on
general economic development and political issues.
3 The IB literature has a few examples of papers on disintegration and rebuilding
of networks between former Soviet republics (e.g., Davis et al., 1996), but these
papers are now rather old. Pittman (2013) covers Central Asia, but from the limited
perspective of transport system restructuring.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2015.03.001
0969-5931/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articMuch of the existing (economics) literature has tended to treat
the CACs as a relatively homogenous region. However, after more
than two decades of independence, important differences are
emerging. In terms of trade performance, the trade/GDP ratio over
the period 1995–2011 is much higher for Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan (38% on average) than for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and
Turkmenistan (26% in average). This ranking also corresponds to
that in the 2013 World Bank ‘‘Doing Business’’ report, which
reﬂects the ease of doing business, tax collection, investor
protection, access to credit, trading across borders, corruption,
economic freedom, and competitiveness. Kazakhstan (49th out of
183 countries) is the highest ranking CAC, followed by Kyrgyzstan
(70), Tajikistan (141), and Uzbekistan (154) while Turkmenistan is
not ranked at all. This perhaps illustrates the close ties between
trade openness and overall politico-economic reforms.
The standard transition literature emphasises a combination of
initial conditions and the reform policies adopted during the
transition period (Falcetti, Lysenko, & Sanfey, 2005 present a good
review). Both initial conditions and, especially, reform policies vary
substantially. Trade performance clearly reﬂects, in part, initial
conditions, such as resource abundance, geography, transport
infrastructure, specialisation, colonial ties, and so on (Elbourgh-
Woytek, 2003; Grigoriou, 2007; Levy, 2007; Pomfret, 2011;
Sinitsina, 2012; Suvankulov & Guc, 2012) as well as national
business culture (Buck, Filatotchev, Demina, & Wright, 2000; Dow
& Karunaratna, 2006; Wu, Li, & Samsell, 2012) or corporatele under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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son, 2003). These are quite heterogeneous, as we discuss below.
However, there is also a strong contrast in terms of reforms
enacted since the mid-1990s, as measured by the EBRD transition
indicators (Stark & Ahrens, 2012). It is not easy to disentangle the
effects of varied initial conditions from those of ongoing reforms,
and this is made even harder by a changing global and regional
environment which impacts the different players to varied degrees
(Levy, 2007).
In the paper, we develop an IB-inspired theoretical framework
to motivate hypotheses and investigate which factors are more
important for each individual CAC by measuring the proportional
share of country-speciﬁc properties and networking factors in
bilateral trade ﬂows. We do this by utilizing the gravity concept
(e.g., Head, Mayer, & Ries, 2010; Zwinkels & Beugelsdijk, 2010),
which explains bilateral trade in terms of country ‘‘masses’’
(country properties) and ‘‘distances’’ (networking). From the
previous literature in the ﬁeld, we would anticipate that these
countries are all relatively isolated from the rest of the World.
However, Pomfret (2010) has indicated that some of these
countries have started engaging in serious reforms, while others
are much slower—we will be seeking evidence in support of this.
We therefore expect that these countries are more heterogeneous
than the previous literature has recognised. In addition to
documenting this heterogeneity, we would identify factors
impacting trade, and link policy reform to trade performance
and business development.
In terms of the detailed econometric work, by taking a ratio of
the ratios of bilateral trade, we can separate country-speciﬁc from
networking (bilateral) factors. Our analysis of 185 CACs bilateral
trade observations, based on a 37 country panel covering the
1995–2011 period shows that: (i) networking factors explain 50%
or more of changes in Kazakhstan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s trade ﬂows
and 5–14% of changes in Turkmenistan’s, Uzbekistan’s and
Tajikistan’s trade; (ii) 75% of changes in the 185 bilateral CACs’
trade ﬂows are mainly explained by country speciﬁc properties,
i.e., monadic driven trade; (iii) 25% of the 185 bilateral CACs’ trade
ﬂows are explained by networking (bilateral) factors such as
transport costs, combined with landlockedness and RTAs, i.e.,
dyadic driven trade; (iv) open CACs are more sensitive to global
and regional shocks compared to isolationist CACs.
2. Context, theory and hypotheses
2.1. The CACs context
All the CACs became independent in 1991. Similarities in initial
conditions reﬂect their history, geographic closeness and cultures.
CACs populations originate from the same Turkic tribes. Historically,
all were colonised by Tsarist Russia and belonged to the Soviet Union
for over 70 years. All geographically landlocked, CACs differ in terms
of neighbours, land sizes and landscape, size of population,
endowment of natural resources, and historic production speciali-
sation. Kazakhstan possesses the largest territory, borders with
Russia and China and has relatively better rail and road connections
left from Soviet times. It is well endowed with oil, coal, metals and
agricultural land. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are
mountainous, smaller in size and population and have mountain
borders with China and Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has a relatively
large population, possesses substantial natural gas reserves and
good conditions for cotton production. Turkmenistan is much more
sparsely populated, but well-endowed with natural gas.
Pomfret (2005) among others concludes that transition reforms
proceeded faster in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and slower in
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. EBRD transition indica-
tors show a similar ranking in terms of privatisation and priceliberalisation—policies which are an important stage of ongoing
transition reforms (Barlow & Radulescu, 2005; Stark & Ahrens,
2012). Although Uzbekistan did well with price liberalisation in the
mid-1990s, it kept enterprises under state control and has been
slow with other reforms. Gas-rich Turkmenistan has been
reluctant to make substantial changes in its economy, although
after the death of the president Nyazov in 2006 the country has
begun to liberalise. Tajikistan went through a civil war (1992–
1997) and since then has been slow to implement reforms.
The CACs faced huge trade and production hardships with the
Soviet collapse and subsequent hyperinﬂation in 1991–1996.
Within a year of independence trade with Russia fell tenfold
(Sinitsina, 2012). Later, in 1998–1999, the CACs were hit by the
Russian ﬁnancial crisis. Despite these circumstances, countries
were already beginning to diverge in terms of international
integration—particularly, though not exclusively with Russia.
Already by 1998 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had joined
several major RTAs with Russia, including the CISFTA in 1994,
EurAsEc and SCO in 1996 while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were
only observers (see Appendix). The CACs’ trade with Russia was
damaged substantially by the 1998 crisis, especially those
countries which had engaged in integration (Westin, 1999). The
more isolationist Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had less exposure.
The period 2000–2007 was more fruitful as world prices for the
CACs’ primary export goods (oil, gas, cotton) accelerated and
volumes of trade and FDI inﬂows, mainly from China and Europe,
increased. The main beneﬁciaries were the more open economies,
but Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also beneﬁted from a global
boom and increasing global gas demand, negotiating with China
and Iran to reduce their dependence on the Russian market. The
2008 crisis had both direct and indirect effects on the CACs’ trade
and economic wellbeing. The exposure of Kazakhstan’s banks to
the global ﬁnancial crisis spread to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan which had more limited ﬁnancial
links with the other CACs, Russia and rest of the world where
originally less affected by the crisis.
2.2. Theory and hypotheses
2.2.1. A game tree of openness and trade: Actors and interactions
The degree of openness or isolation of an economy can be seen
as the outcome of the interaction of decisions of a number of actors
in response to their environment and to each other. The principle
actors in any economy constitute consumers/voters, government,
MNEs and local ﬁrms: however, we should also note that the
speciﬁc post-Soviet environment tends to include important roles
for ethnic (particularly Russian) minorities and for the politically-
connected oligarchs who rose during and just after the fall of
Communism. Broadly speaking, Fig. 1 shows a game tree outlining
the interactions of these actors.
Trade policy is set by the governments, and may take the form of
multilateral liberalisation or regional integration (the latter being
increasingly favoured by the intended development of the Eurasian
Union). Governments also set the regulatory environment
governing trade and FDI, and have inﬂuence on the legal
environment, as well as inﬂuencing the quality of transport
linkages and border efﬁciency. The presence of multinational
agreements and RTAs shows that governments interact with one
another: particularly their neighbours (and the rest of the world).
At the same time, however, the trade performance of an
economy depends upon the decisions of other actors (at micro
level), notably ﬁrms. If the larger local ﬁrms and MNEs respond to
liberalisation by expanding trade greatly, then the country will see
an increase in competition and specialisation gains from trade, in
turn beneﬁting consumers. The more elastic is ﬁrms’ response, the
less will be the ‘beggar-my-neighbour’ incentive of a country to
Fig. 1. A game tree of openness and trade: actors and interactions.
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Firms’ responses will, of course, reﬂect remoteness and transport
networks, as well as ‘psychic’ distance as demonstrated by Dow
and Karunaratna (2006). Limao and Venables (2001) ﬁnd that trade
performance is affected by high overland transport costs of goods.
Historic business networks (Rauch & Trindade, 2002) and their
collapse and re-emergence (Davis, Patterson, & Grazin, 1996) and
colonial ties (Head et al., 2010)4 also play an important role. To the
extent that MNEs drive the trade response, their liability of
foreignness (Zaheer, 1995, 2002) can be an important factor as
well. However, Yildiz and Fey (2012) argue that in transition (and
emerging) countries the liability of foreignness is relatively less
important due to ability of NMEs to bypass local suppliers,
customers’ favourable stereotypes and curb of appeal brought by
the MNEs, and possibly host governments’ desire for FDI and
foreign technology (e.g., Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer, 2004).
Depending upon the response of ﬁrms, there will be gains in
income (perhaps with offsetting losses in security) to voters (in
Fig. 1, deﬁned as theta which will increase). However, in countries
of limited democracy with powerful oligarchs, the lobbying power
of the latter is also crucial: if oligarchs’ power is based in exporting
industries (such as through the control of natural resources), they
may favour trade expansion, while if they control import-
competing industries they will resist growth in trade or FDI (in
Fig. 1, (1-theta) will increase).
In line with standard political economy bargaining theory, we
can see the decision-making by government as reﬂecting the
relative bargaining weights of voters and oligarchs, which will be
dependent on the political and institutional makeup of the country.
2.2.2. The actors in the CACs
2.2.2.1. Governments. A recent IMF Survey (IMF, 2012) ﬁnds a
strong correlation between political regime and trade policies of
the CACs. While all countries have relatively authoritarian regimes,4 Acharya et al. (2011) assert the impact of colonial ties between former Soviet
countries on current trade patterns.there are still considerable differences in political systems.
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are somewhat more liberal compared
to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Kaser (1998) and
Luong and Weinthal (2002) link CACs’ economic performance to
variation in political regimes, as Kazakhstan is characterised as
‘‘populist with soft autocracy’’, Kyrgyzstan as ‘‘dualist with
electoral democracy’’, and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmeni-
stan as ‘‘centralist with hard autocracy’’. Reﬂecting this, economic
liberalisation of each CAC is at different stages. There are many
other related country-speciﬁc features (majority and minority
population make up, liberalisation level, FDI level and so on) that
affect CACs trade performance. Some CACs (Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) have a higher level of government
intervention and state control in their economies compared to
others (Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) where the economy is more
liberal and relatively more inﬂuenced by regional or global
economic conditions.
2.2.2.2. Firms. According to Pomfret (2010), Turkmenistan, Uzbe-
kistan and Tajikistan, relative to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are
among the slowest of the transition economies to reform, with
ﬁrms facing less competition and softer budget constraints
compared to Russia, let alone the EU Accession states. Neverthe-
less, the CACs, like other transition countries, have experienced
radical transformations in their political and business landscapes
due to the wave of deregulation and liberalisation of their
economies after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Hoskisson,
Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Filatotchev et al., 2003). These dramatic
economic and political changes affecting CACs ﬁrms can be seen as
regulatory punctuations leading to radical environmental change
(Haveman, Russo, & Meyer, 2001; Perez-Batres & Eden, 2008).
Firms’ strategic responses to radical environmental change are an
important factor for the aggregate trade performance of CACs.
To better understand ﬁrm responses to regulatory punctuations
in the CACs, we ﬁnd useful insights in the IB literature on liability of
foreignness, and particularly the extension to this concept by
Perez-Batres and Eden (2008) who introduced the parallel concept
of ‘‘liability of localness’’. Eden and Miller’s (2004) deﬁnition of
5 http://wwweurasiareview.com/
06082014-post-crimea-central-asian-fear-putins-stick-analysis/.
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hazards associated with ‘‘being a stranger in a strange land’’.
Similar to liability of foreignness facing potential MNE incomers
(e.g., Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997; Eden & Miller, 2004), the
ongoing transition reforms are producing a degree of ‘liability of
localness’ (Perez-Batres & Eden, 2008), with local ﬁrms less
familiar with operating in a globalised and marketised environ-
ment. Thus, liability of localness is about the added costs faced by
local ﬁrms, adjusting to ‘‘now’’ being different from ‘‘then’’; the
competitive landscape facing the ﬁrms has shifted markedly,
necessitating new strategies for survival. Local ﬁrms need to learn
the ‘rules of the game’ under liberalisation (Dunning, 2003; Miller
& Pisani, 2007).
Perez-Batres and Eden (2008) demonstrate that emerging
market ﬁrms with international experience in developed coun-
tries can better interpret their home market evolving institutions
which in turn lessens the emerging market ﬁrms’ liability of
localness. In a related analysis D’Aveni and Macmillan (1990)
show that under strenuous situations, such as regulatory
punctuations, ﬁrms focusing their attention on the external
environment outperformed those focusing their attention on the
internal aspects of the business. Their argument rests on the
notion that most internal aspects of the business are not
necessarily aligned with the new business landscape and need
to change. Alternatively, ﬁrms that focus on the internal aspects of
their business, during strenuous situations, may be operating
under the assumptions of past cognitive, normative, or regulatory
structures. Given the prevailing privatisation methods in CACs
such as buyouts by local managers and ‘‘give-away’’ deals
(Filatotchev et al., 2003) many ﬁrms with incumbent managers
have focused their attention on the internal aspects of the
business thus facing high liability of localness.
Furthermore, under uncertain political and economic condi-
tions such as after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many CACs
ﬁrms would have not necessarily understood their new institu-
tional environment and this misconception (Scott, 1997) has
hindered their ability to function. According to March (1988), the
greater the uncertainty, the more likely organisations are to engage
in exchange relations with those with whom they have transacted
in the past and with those of similar status. Thus, in the CACs, given
that many ﬁrms were trading or had closer organisational links
with ﬁrms from other Soviet Union countries, especially Russia, it
is likely that trade patterns after political independence and
market liberalisation will remain strongly associated with the
former Soviet Union countries, and in particular Russia. Such an
assertion is also in line with Dow and Karunaratna’s (2006) concept
of ‘psychic’ distance stimuli.
In summary, the implication for our theoretical framework is
that the liability of localness produces a position where oligarchs
and state-actors in industries opening to foreign competition may
lose. In turn, the weakness of local ﬁrms – the liability of localness –
increases the proﬁt-shifting motives for protectionism (Bagwell &
Staiger, 2012), and also increases the risks of protectionist lobbying
by oligarchs.
2.2.2.3. Voters and the role of minorities. Although Russian-
speaking minorities have shrunk considerably since 1989,
estimates from 2007 suggest that there were still 4 million ethnic
Russians in Kazakhstan (25% of the population) and 500,000 (or
about 10% of the population) in Kyrgyzstan. By contrast, the
formerly sizeable Russian populations in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan
and Turkmenistan have shrunk to less than 3% of the population
(Peyrouse, 2008). Given that the role of language ties is often
emphasised as a driver of trade (Dow & Karunaratna, 2006), it is
likely that Russian minorities will stimulate policy towards
openness—at least in the form of RTAs with Russia (and Belarus).This is magniﬁed by the increasing foreign policy assertiveness of
Russia vis a vis ethnic Russians beyond its borders5. Ethnic
composition and pressure from Russia may both explain why
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are more open – yet more biased
towards Russia – in trade than other CACs.
2.2.2.4. The environment and speciﬁcities of CACs. The CACs are
large in area, though sparsely populated, and are all landlocked.
This reduces trade potential, compared to countries with sea
ports. Raballand (2003) emphasises the variation in the effect of
landlockedness in each CAC. Adding to this are issues of transport
infrastructure and logistics services in the CACs (Grigoriou,
2007). Reduced trade potential also reduces the potential
beneﬁts to a country from trade liberalisation. Again, Kazakh-
stan, which has industrialised border areas closer to the Russian
Urals, may have more trade potential than countries further to
the South.
Resource endowment has an important inﬂuence on trade
performance. Auty (2001), World Bank (2002), Pomfret (2004),
Felipe, Kumar, Abdon, and Bacate (2012) all point out that there is a
strong correlation between the resource abundance and trade
performance of the CACs. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan can be
viewed as much richer in resources than the other CACs; while this
has a clear effect on trade outcome (the recovery in resource prices
from 2000 boosted these economies), the effect upon policy is
harder to determine, since Kazakhstan is relatively open and
Turkmenistan isolationist.
Historical environment also affects current performance by
government and ﬁrms. The role of inter-ﬁrm networking is
explored in Davis et al. (1996) for the case of decline and re-
emergence of Soviet era ties in Estonia—but similar networking
factors apply to Central Asia. Historically poor governance may
make effective trade reforms difﬁcult. Tai and Lee (2009)
emphasise bureaucratic barriers to trade: investors spend 20%
(in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) and 48% (in Tajikistan, Turkmeni-
stan, and Uzbekistan) of their time to deal with unnecessary
bureaucracy. Using the 2010 World Bank Governance Indicators
(WGI), Magilevskii (2012) points out the heterogeneity of
governance efﬁciency; out of 230 countries, Kazakhstan ranks
138, Kyrgyzstan 171, Tajikistan 187, Uzbekistan 199, and
Turkmenistan 201. The importance of governance environment
for trade is also emphasised by Wu et al. (2012).
2.2.3. Hypotheses: Expectations and feedback in the openness game
Non-government actors will affect government policy via three
routes. The ﬁrst is through direct feedback: the various players will
support or oppose reform depending upon their perceived self-
interest: their inﬂuence will depend upon the political reality and
bargaining power. The second is through expectations (affected by
uncertainty), as in any forward-looking game expected gains will
determine the nature and degree of lobbying. The third is the
interaction of different lobbies across countries, given that the
beneﬁts of trade liberalisation are usually greater when the
countries act concertedly.
The history of post-Communist transition countries’ reform
process is also important in determining whether a country is
likely to engage in further liberalisation. Based on EBRD data,
Barlow and Radulescu (2005) ﬁnd, for example, that reform is more
likely to continue and spread to other areas in economies where
there is early privatisation of small business. This may well feed
back through differences in the lobbying balance within the
economies.
Table 1
CACs exports, imports and internal trade.
1995–1999 2000–2003 2004–2007 2008–2011
Total Exports (in bln U.S. dollars)
Kazakhstan 21.9 29.0 64.0 103.4
Kyrgyzstan 1.3 1.5 2.2 2.6
Tajikistan 0.9 0.8 1.7 2.2
Turkmenistan 4.5 5.9 14.1 18.9
Uzbekistan 5.7 4.9 11.9 19.8
Total Imports (in bln U.S. dollars)
Kazakhstan 22.3 28.4 66.6 93.4
Kyrgyzstan 1.3 1.4 2.5 2.6
Tajikistan 0.9 0.8 1.9 2.4
Turkmenistan 4.5 5.6 14.4 28.1
Uzbekistan 5.7 4.7 13.7 22.0
Total Internal trade (in bln U.S. dollars)
Kazakhstan 20.2 23.4 73.7 135.5
Kyrgyzstan 1.6 1.5 3.1 5.1
Tajikistan 1.0 1.2 3.0 5.8
Turkmenistan 3.6 7.7 20.0 32.2
Uzbekistan 14.2 11.1 18.3 38.8
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (2013).
6 Note that Eq. (1) follows Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) in assuming
imports and exports have a proportional effect on bilateral trade; however, this
assumption can easily be relaxed, as we do later in our estimated equations.
7 The elasticity of substitution should be larger than one, s > 1, but exact values
may change as preferences and trade opportunities change. The debates over
precise level of elasticity of substitution have been ongoing for quit long, and it
seems there is still no consensus what it should be like. For example, some papers
use relatively low s; for example Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) use 1.5 and
Coeurdacier, Kolmann, and Martin (2007) use 0.6–2. Other papers use relatively
high s; for example, Hummels (2001) at around 9 and Romalis (2007) chooses 11.
However, since Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004),
many trade papers tend to pick value somewhere between 5-10, although some
papers have estimated it instead.
8 Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) proposed an iterative procedure to estimate
MRT terms based on non-linear least squares but because of its complexity it was
overshadowed by simpler proxies such as ‘‘remoteness’’ or ﬁxed effect dummies.
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CAC) can be seen in Table 1. Crucially, observed trade in all CACs
has recovered sharply in the period since 1998. The common factor
is that incomes in the Central Asian region grew sharply, spurred
by growing demand from its main export market (Russia) and, in
resource-rich countries, by rising mineral prices. While Kyrgyzstan
may have seen lower export growth than, say, Turkmenistan, this
difference can be explained by the fact that the latter is a major gas
exporter, at a time when fossil fuel demand was buoyant, while the
former is resource-poor.
Clearly, observed changes in trade volumes reﬂect the complex
interactions represented in the openness game tree: the key role of
gravity analysis that follows is in decomposing and quantitatively
explaining the outcomes depicted in Table 1. Following on the
discussion in our theory section and to help interpret in a
structured way our gravity analysis results we formulate four
empirical hypotheses:
H1. The observed recovery in trade volume (outcome measures of
global integration) is not necessarily driven by falling trade costs
(policy measure), but partially reﬂects other country speciﬁc or
environmental factors.
H2. Networking (bilateral) factors have strongly boosted trade in
the more open CACs, whereas the more isolationist countries’ trade
has grown in spite of, rather than because of, trade policy.
H3. The countries which have opted for stronger regional integra-
tion with other CIS states are also more open towards the Rest of
the World (RoW) than the isolationist CACs.
H4. Cyclical ﬂuctuations in the trade of the more open CACs are
more closely linked to those of the RoW while isolationist CACs’
trade is only weakly affected by cyclical ﬂuctuations in the RoW
economies.
If trade reforms can be seen as part of an overall reform process,
then we would anticipate that the more reforming countries are
reducing the liability on foreign ﬁrms doing business, but the
trade-off is that the liability on local ﬁrms is increased. However,
this may in turn spur reforms among local ﬁrms, increasing their
ability to export. This dynamic process is consistent with the more
macroeconomic-level predictions in H2. The ability to export more
to the RoW in H3 again reﬂects the effects of trade reforms within
the CIS, and Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan, prompting restructuring of
local ﬁrms, overcoming their liability for exporting.3. Methodology and data
3.1. The gravity concept
We utilise the gravity model of trade (GMT), a modiﬁed form of
Newton’s gravity equation, this predicts bilateral trade ﬂows based
on economic sizes and geographic distance of two trading
countries (Zwinkels & Beugelsdijk, 2010). The GMT has been
proven to be consistent with empirical ﬁndings, and to which have
been added theoretical foundations (Anderson & Van Wincoop,
2003; Bergstrand, 1989; Deardorff, 1998; Eaton & Kortum, 2002;
Chaney, 2008; Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstrein, 2008). We start
with Anderson and van Wincoop’s (Anderson & Van Wincoop,
2003) theory-based GMT which takes the following form:
xi j ¼
yiy j
yw
ti j
PiP j
 1s
; (1)
where xij is nominal exports from country i to country j, yi and yj
are economic sizes of country i and j, respectively, yw is world
economic size, tij is trade cost, Pi and Pj are the respective price
indices, and s is the elasticity of substitution.6,7
World economic size equals the sum of nominal incomes of all
countries j, yw ¼
P
jy j. Theoretically, the economic size of country i
(yi) is equal to the gross consumption of goods (produced in
country i) by country j at a price (pij) that differs from j’s domestic
price level by the inclusion of a trade cost (tij):
yi ¼
X
j
ci j pi j (2)
Country j’s economic size (yi) is calculated analogously. It is
common practice in a gravity analysis to weight the economic size
using the nominal GDP of the country.
The central contribution of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)
is the concept of multilateral resistance to trade (MRT). The
outward trade resistance, Pi and inward trade resistance, Pj are
price indices that take into account the weighted aggregate values
of observable traded costs across all possible export partners of i
and import partners of j, respectively, and take the form of CES unit
cost functions:
Pi ¼
X
j
Ps1j u jt
1s
i j
0
@
1
A1=1s ; (3)
P j ¼
X
i
Ps1i uit
1s
i j
  !1=1s
(4)
While MRT terms are not directly observable, gravity studies
provide methods to proxy them8.
9 The 37 countries considered are Algeria, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China,
Croatia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and
Uzbekistan.
10 Taking log of 1+trf is necessary to account for the cases with zero tariffs in our
data.
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are symmetric, and of ‘‘iceberg’’ form (Samuelson, 1952):
ti j ¼
X
m¼1
zmi j
 gm
; (5)
where zmi j is a function of bilateral trade barriers (transport cost,
tariffs, quotas etc.) and the parameter gm. The geographic distance
between trading countries i and j can serve as proxy of transport
cost.
3.2. The gravity decomposition
The GMT is a simple model with strong predictive power, and
has been extensively used for empirical studies since its ﬁrst
implementation by Tinbergen (1962). Researchers have devel-
oped extension and decomposition techniques to allow the GMT
to measure overall trade costs (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2004;
Jacks, Meissner, & Novy, 2009; Head et al., 2010) or unobservable
MTRs (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2003; Baier & Bergstrand,
2009).
We make use of a gravity consistent extension of the AvW
procedure called the ‘‘tetrad’’ method (see Head et al., 2010). This
allows us to capture time varying bilateral effects (for instance,
caused by changes in tariffs or non-tariff measures) on trade
volumes by eliminating (by division) all importer, exporter, and
global (time) effects as well as ﬁxed bilateral effects (such as
distance or colonial ties). In addition to exporter i and importer j
countries, we need to take another two countries, one as reference
exporter l and another as reference importer k. So by taking a
‘‘tetrad’’ of Eq. (1) with ij, ik, lj, and lk sets and denoting it as ß, it
can be represented as
ß ilð Þ jkð Þ ¼
xij=xik
xlj=xlk
; (6)
which then through elimination of monadic yiy j=yw PiP j
 1s 
and ﬁxed dyadic terms (t¯i j) can be reduced to ‘‘tetrad’’ of ws:
ß ilð Þ jkð Þ ¼
’ij=’ik
’lj=’lk
¼ ’˜ijt (7)
where ’˜ijt ¼ ðtijÞ1s is an overall measure of observable and
unobservable trade-cost factors. Although ’˜ijt s contain elasticity
of substitution (s), no assumption about the level of elasticity
needs to be imposed which is crucially important since exoge-
nously introduced level of elasticity is always questionable.
Unlike traditional ﬁxed effect methods, the tetrad approach
allows for time-varying changes in relative trade costs across
different country pairs. For example, Head et al. (2010) analyse the
time varying effect of independence on trade between a metropolis
(coloniser), colony, and siblings (other colonies), to capture the
effect of other relevant bilateral factors (changes in RTA, GATT
membership, and currency rates). Romalis (2007) used the
approach to evaluate the effect of NAFTA tariffs on trade ﬂows
among USA, Mexico, and Canada. Our purpose is to decompose the
GMT into two parts:
xij ¼ DijMi; j; (8)
where the dyad, Dij, stand for varying overall trade measure
powered by trade elasticity, 1 – s. The dyad represents the
country-pair-speciﬁc (ij) networking or trade cost component of
trade:
Dij ¼ ’ij: (9)
The monad, Mi,j, is the combination of the country speciﬁc
components for each country in the pair ij: economic size and MRT.This is derived by eliminating Dij from
Eq. (1):(10)Mi; j ¼ yiy jP
j
y jðPiP jÞ1s
:
3.3. Data
Our bilateral trade panel contains 37 countries over the period
1995–20119. The selection of countries was based on volume of
trade with the CACs region. Sadly, data on 1989–1992 period are
either missing or if reported are unreliable; these problems also
apply to the data for the period till 1994 which is characterised by
hyperinﬂation. Consequently, our study starts from 1995.
Bilateral trade ﬂows and tariff rates for the 1995–2011 period,
in 2007 US dollars were obtained from WITS (www.wits.org). This
contains both the COMTRADE and TRAINS bilateral databases, both
of which contain some of the necessary data, as COMTRADE covers
only WTO members, while TRAINS covers all the CACs, but
aggregates the EU into one single region. The other issue was that
one third of all trade data for some countries was missing or
unreported; consequently we had to use interpolation which
allowed reduction of missing trade data from 1/3 to 1/5.
GDP levels were obtained from the IMF International Financial
Statistics database (www.imf.org), while geographic distances
between capital cities of the countries and standard gravity
dummies for colonisation, common language, and common border
were obtained from CEPII (www.cepii.fr). Additional binomial
dummies for landlockedness and RTA membership were also
included. Summary statistics, description of variables and correla-
tion matrixes are reported in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
3.4. The estimation model
We estimate a set of log-linear models. First, we consider a
standard OLS model with ﬁxed effect dummies:
ln xijt ¼ a0 þ a1 ln yit þ a2 ln yjt þ a3 ln tijt þ a4Iit þ a5Ijt þ a6It
þ eijt; (11)
where a0 is constant, yit and yjt are proxied with nominal GDP
levels of exporter i and importer j country respectively, a3 ¼ 1  s
is trade elasticity, eijt is error term; Iit is exporter-year, Ijt is
importer-year, and It represents year binary dummies to proxy Pit,
Pjt, and yw, respectively, for theoretical consistency. Our trade costs
take the following form:
ln tijt ¼ b1 ln distij þ b2 ln 1 þ trfijt
 þ b3 langij þ b4 colij
þ b5 bordij þ b6 llocki þ b7 llockij þ b8 RTAit
þ b9 RTAijt þ uijt: (12)
In Eq. (12), the geographic distance (dist) proxy for transport
cost, trf10 stands for border cost, and further binomial dummies
capture effects of historic (common language and colony),
geographic (sharing borders, one and both landlocked), and
economic linkages (one and both in RTA) effects on trade cost; u
is error term. In the equation time constant variables, unlike time
variant ones, have no time subscript.
As previously mentioned, the derived values from tetrading –
the dyads – stand for time-varying bilateral factors, which can be
Table 3
Correlation matrix (n = 19,522).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 ln xijt 1.0
2 ln yit 0.5730 1
3 ln yjt 0.4894 0.0403 1
4 ln distij 0.2440 0.1238 0.1976 1
5 ln(1 + trfijt) 0.2336 0.0065 0.0756 0.3634 1
6 bordij 0.1384 0.0216 0.0321 0.3260 0.0424 1
7 lanfij 0.1033 0.0371 0.0171 0.0467 0.0185 0.2751 1
8 colij 0.1316 0.0430 0.0462 0.0728 0.0080 0.2487 0.2890 1
9 llocki 0.3106 0.1963 0.1413 0.0387 0.0270 0.0132 0.0204 124 1
10 llockij 0.1508 0.2738 0.2843 0.1872 0.1147 0.0979 0.0544 0.0683 0.3117 1
11 RTAit 0.3697 0.2484 0.2212 0.1035 0.1569 0.0276 0.1166 0.0399 0.3831 0.1292 1
12 RTAijt 0.0264 0.1897 0.2136 0.1406 0.0587 0.1613 0.1734 0.2310 0.0861 0.4211 0.1427 1
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for the variables (n = 23,274).
Variable Description Min Max Mean s.d.
yr Year 1995 2011 2003 4.899
xijt Exports, in billions of US dollars 0 1038090 971.21 14862.54
yit GDP of exporter, in billions of US dollars 0.569 28062 972.01 2345.5
yjt GDP of importer, in billions of US dollars 0.569 28062 972.01 2345.5
distij Geographic distance, in km 69.04 11763.9 3512.8 2578.6
trfijt Effectively applied tariffs, in percentages 0 121.04 3.4594 5.6896
bordij Dummy for common border between I and j is 1, otherwise 0 0 1 0.078 0.2695
langij Dummy for common language between I and j is 1, otherwise 0 0 1 0.0394 0.1946
colij Dummy for common colonial history between I and j is 1, otherwise 0 0 1 0.0321 0.1763
llocki Dummy for landlocked I is 1, otherwise 0 0 1 0.4558 0.4980
llockij Dummy for both landlocked I and j is 1, otherwise 0 0 1 0.1234 0.3289
RTAit Dummy for RTA membership of I only is 1, otherwise 0 0 1 0.3389 0.4733
RTAijt Dummy for both, I and j, are members of the same RTA is 1, otherwise 0 0 1 0.0467 0.2111
Radi Radius of I from (0,0) geographic coordinate 3.6427 17.33361 10.268 3.8370
Radj Radius of j from (0,0) geographic coordinate 3.6427 17.33361 10.268 3.8370
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ln xijt ¼ d0 þ d1 ln yit þ d2 ln yjt þ d3 ln ’˜ijt þ d4Iit þ d5Ijt
þ d6It þ eijt; (13)
where
ln ’˜ijt ¼ c0 þ c1 ln distij þ c2 ln 1 þ trfijt
 þ c3 langij
þ c4 colij þ c5 bordij þ c6 llocki þ c7 llockij
þ c8 RTAit þ c9 RTAijt þ uijt: (14)
Feenstra (2004) states that ﬁxed effects models are the most
reliable and simple method to estimate gravity of trade ﬂows. The
ﬁxed effect dummies proxy the omitted MRT terms effect. If the
interest is as in our case to estimate coefﬁcients of time-invariant
variables (such as distance) then Dummy Variable Least Squares
(DVLS) method which works the same way as ﬁxed effects model is
appropriate to use11.
Potentially, DVLS estimates could suffer from serial correlation,
non-stationarity and endogeneity. Moreover, DVLS does not take
into account zero trade values where it is unknown whether these
are true zeroes or unreported values. In any case zero trade values
should not be neglected, especially when 1/5 of our observations
are zeroes. Experts suggest re-estimating the GMT using other
estimators that handle these issues such as TSLS (Two Stage Least
Squares) to control for endogeneity bias (Egger, Larch, Staub, &
Winkelmann, 2011), DVLS (with AR option) – for autocorrelation
issue (Martin, Anderson, & Pham, 2009), PPML (Poisson Pseudo
Maximum Likelihood) estimator – for inclusion of zero trade11 The ﬁxed effect estimator drops all the variables that are constant over time like
distances, therefore, including ﬁxed effect dummies produces the same results as
the ﬁxed effect estimator but also estimates coefﬁcients for constant variables.values, and FDE (First Differencing) estimator – for stationarity of
variables as discussed by Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk (2010).
Following the relevant literature we run tests for non-stationarity
and co-integration and report the results in Table 4 which shows
that some variables (GDPs and RTAs) are non-stationary in levels
but stationary in ﬁrst differences. Furthermore, there seems to be
no issues with cointegration of variables.
4. Estimation results
4.1. Gravity model results
Results are presented in Table 5, where control variables are
categorised into country-speciﬁc factors (importer and exporter
GDP), time-invariant bilateral (networking) factors (distance,
landlockedness, shared common borders, common language,
and common historical coloniser), and time-variant bilateral
factors (tariff rates, participation in RTA). The estimates in columns
1 to 5 are obtained using (1) Dummy Variable Least Squares (DVLS)
with the STATA’s robust and cluster option, (2) DVLS with AR
option, (3) Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS), (4) Poisson Pseudo
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator, and (5) First Differencing
(FDE) estimator respectively.
Regarding signs, estimated coefﬁcients across different esti-
mators show a logical relationship between the explained variable
and explanatory variables and agree with correlation matrix
results (Table 3); trade is positively associated with both exporter
and importer GDPs as well as with the dummies for a common
language, and with the countries being members of the same RTA,
while in contrast, distance, landlockedness, and tariff rates are
negatively correlated with trade. However, we observe some sign
disagreements of coefﬁcients (depending on estimator in use) such
as unexpected signs of tariff and colony variables in PPML column.
Table 4
Non-stationarity and cointegration test results.
(a) Phillips–Perron non-stationarity test
Statistic p-Value Statistic p-Value
ln xijt Level Difference
P Inverse chi-squared (2610) 6495.4 0 2.18e+04 0
Z Inverse normal 17.1 0 95.4 0
L* Inverse logit t(6234) 29.1 0 162.7 0
Pm Modiﬁed inverse chi-squared 53.4 0 265.2 0
ln yit Level Difference
P Inverse chi-squared (2738) 1439.1 1 5220.6 0
Z Inverse normal 21.3 1 25.3 0
L* Inverse logit t(6664) 19.2 1 26.9 0
Pm Modiﬁed inverse chi-squared 17.5 1 33.5 0
ln yjt Level Difference
P Inverse chi-squared (2738) 1439.1 1 5220.6 0
Z Inverse normal 21.3 1 25.3 0
L* Inverse logit t(6664) 19.2 1 26.9 0
Pm Modiﬁed inverse chi-squared 17.5 1 33.5 0
ln(1 + trfijt) Level Difference
P Inverse chi-squared (2738) 6777.9 0 2.72e+04 0
Z Inverse normal 25.1 0 127.4 0
L* Inverse logit t(5994) 37.1 0 215.5 0
Pm Modiﬁed inverse chi-squared 54.6 0 330.7 0
RTAit Level Difference
P Inverse chi-squared (2738) 283.7 1 3795.4 0
Z Inverse normal 11.8 1 46.9 0
L* Inverse logit t(2039) 10.7 1 51.7 0
Pm Modiﬁed inverse chi-squared 33.1 1 14.2 0
RTAijt Level Difference
P Inverse chi-squared (2738) 209.4 1 3631.5 0
Z Inverse normal 13.7 1 46.7 0
L* Inverse logit t(1834) 12.4 1 52.2 0
Pm Modiﬁed inverse chi-squared 34.1 1 12.1 0
(b) Westerlund ECM cointegration test
xijt/yit/ln yjt/RTAit/RTAijt Statistic Z-value p-Value
Gt 1.155 50.005 1
Ga 2.997 77.040 1
Pa 11.493 101.502 1
Note: In (a) null hypothesis is variable is non-stationary, and in (b) null hypothesis is no cointegration.
Table 5
Gravity regression estimates.
Estimation method DVLS (1) DVLS(AR) (2) PPML (3) TSLS (4) FDE (5)
Dependent variable: lnxijt
Country speciﬁc terms
Constant 10.49 (1.205)*** 12.48 (0.84)*** 20.23 (1.135)*** 5.87 (0.421)*** 0.16 (0.036)***
ln yjt 0.78 (0.046)
*** 0.69 (0.028)*** 0.55 (0.043)*** 0.62 (0.012)*** 0.39 (0.17)*
ln yit 0.14 (0.038)
*** 0.07 (0.013)*** 0.41 (0.04)*** 0.26 (0.009)*** 0.07 (0.025)**
Time invariant bilateral terms
lndistij 1.67 (0.092)*** 1.68 (0.05)*** 2.19 (0.1)*** 1.04 (0.053)***
bordij 0.29 (0.160)*** 0.33 (0.143)* 1.16 (0.189)*** 0.44 (0.2)*
langij 0.40 (0.213) 0.43 (0.187)
* 0.64 (0.334) 0.54 (0.314)
colij 0.48 (0.286) 0.49 (0.212)
* 0.63 (0.252)* 0.63 (0.767)
locki 1.25 (0.446)** 1.88 (0.347)*** 3.72 (0.371)*** 1.5 (0.108)***
lockij 1.02 (1.874) 2.24 (0.691)** 5.24 (0.703)*** 1.55 (0.756)***
Time variant bilateral terms
ln(1 + trfijt) 3.65 (0.518)*** 2.55 (0.163)*** 0.44 (2.284) 3.83 (0.175)*** 1.99 (0.372)***
RTAit 0.01 (0.046) 0.02 (0.024) 1.12 (0.32)*** 0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.025)
RTAijt 0.41 (0.047)
*** 0.35 (0.026)*** 1.64 (0.189)*** 0.42 (0.024)*** 0.20 (0.027)***
Observations 19,522 19,522 23,273 19,522 18,079
Adj. R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.59 0.64
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels are *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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correlation to trade, but only TSLS column conﬁrms it in the CACs
case.
Regarding magnitudes, estimated coefﬁcients across all esti-
mators are similar which enables us to conﬁrm a range of
predictions. DVLS and DVLS (AR) coefﬁcients are more similar
compared to TSLS or PPML ones, indicating that serial correlation isnot a severe issue (as expected for short time-series panel).
Controlling for endogeneity changes some coefﬁcients slightly
(GDPs, distance, and border), but inclusion of zero trade values
produces even more change in coefﬁcients for most variables. This
is notable from the number of observations in the DVLS and TSLS
cases (19,522) and in the PPML case (23,273). Inclusion of more
observations indeed gives more precise estimates, and in fact we
Table 6
Tetrad regression estimates.
Estimation method DVLS (1) DVLS(AR) (2) PPML (3) TSLS (4)
(a) Dependent variable: ln xijt
ln yjt 0.32 (0.013)
*** 0.67 (0.019)*** 0.04 (0.004)***
ln yit 0.23 (0.012)
*** 0.07 (0.008)*** 0.03 (0.002)***
ln ˜’i jt 0.98 (0.002)
*** 0.95 (0.007)***
(b) Dependent variable: ln ’˜ijt
lndistij –1.65 (0.09)
*** –1.66 (0.051)*** –2.06 (0.104)*** –0.68 (0.081)***
bordij –0.27 (0.161) –0.30 (0.145)
* –1.13 (0.183)*** 0.8 (0.285)**
langij 0.39 (0.213) 0.43 (0.19)
* 0.6 (0.33) 0.92 (0.372)*
colij 0.49 (0.286) 0.52 (0.216)
* 0.57 (0.243)* 0.95 (0.408)*
llocki –6.36 (0.322)
*** –6.39 (0.298)*** –6.88 (0.241)*** –2.51 (0.145)***
llockij –11.27 (0.613)
*** –11.29 (0.592)*** –11.72 (0.446)*** –3.49 (0.227)***
ln(1 + trfijt). –4.28 (0.532)
*** –2.94 (0.174)*** –3.32 (2.359) –7.39 (0.215)***
RTAit –0.01 (0.048) –0.02 (0.025) –0.95 (0.168)
*** 0.14 (0.025)***
RTAijt 0.47 (0.05)
*** 0.38 (0.027)*** 1.62 (0.149)*** 0.86 (0.026)***
Constant 8.21 (0.972)*** 8.37 (0.712)*** 13.04 (0.956)*** –7.01 (0.659)***
Observations 16.426 16.426 19,166 16,426
Adj. R-squared 0.82 0.81 0.31
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels are *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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improvements in estimates due to inclusion of zero trades it is hard
to rely on PPML as its goodness of ﬁt is only 59% and lower than the
other estimators’ ﬁt of 81–82%. FDE compared with DVLS provides
coefﬁcients almost twice smaller—a regularity, which has been
pointed out in Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk (2010).
Based on Eqs. (13) and (14) gravity variables are re-estimated
and reported in Table 6. Comparing the country speciﬁc
coefﬁcients in Table 6 (part a) and Table 5 conﬁrm that importer
GDP is more important than the exporter’s, however, DVLS (AR)
provides more similar values that are in line with GDP coefﬁcients
presented in Table 5. In Table 6 (part b) dependent variable is a
product of a tetrad which is regressed over gravity trade cost
variables. Coefﬁcient signs and magnitudes are quite similar to
ones in Table 5 while coefﬁcients for some variables such as
landlockedness are signiﬁcant and quite high, at least for estimates
from DVLS, DVLS (AR) and PPML, while TSLS values fall well in line
with gravity estimates. Estimated coefﬁcients by both the gravity
and tetrad models can be grouped into two categories according to
their economic and statistical signiﬁcance.
4.1.1. Variables which are both statistically and economically
signiﬁcant: Tariffs, distance and landlockedness
A 10% increase in distance leads to a 16–22% decrease in trade.
Similar results are obtained by Suvankulov and Guc (2012). Usually
gravity studies estimate distance coefﬁcient equal to one but the
geographic distance is indeed important factor when we talk about
CACs trade. The huge distance of CACs from the major trade centres
creates a big obstacle for their goods to be competitive in world
markets. The effect is exacerbated further by the fact that CACs are
landlocked having no direct access to sea corridors. A 13–35% or
10–51% trade drops when one (exporter or importer) or both
traders are landlocked respectively. Except for the PPML results in
Table 5, we ﬁnd that tariffs are statistically and economically
signiﬁcant as an increase in tariff rate by 1% causes about 1.9–3.8%
reduction in trade.
4.1.2. Variables which are only statistically (but not economically)
signiﬁcant: RTA membership, GDP levels and common border
To reduce trading costs CACs join RTAs which is beneﬁcial only
to those who are in the same RTA. A pair of countries joining a RTA
leads to 5–16% trade increase, while if only one country is a RTA
member trade drops by 0.6–17%. A 10% increase of exporter’s GDP
increase trade by 0.6–4.8%, while 10% importer’s GDP increase
leads to 3.9–7.8% increase in trade meaning that importer’s GDP is
twice as important in the case of CACs. This ﬁnding makes sensewhen we consider the fact that overland transportation costs in
trade with CACs are very high and these are passed to importers
(Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2004). In contrast to other gravity
studies, a common border negatively affects trade—trade drops by
0.3–1%. This might be explained by the fact that we considering
trade of landlocked countries which have to pay extra costs
associated with crossing territories of neighbouring (landlocked)
countries in order to export or import goods.
4.2. Gravity decomposition results
There are 185 (5 CACs by 37 partners) country pair trade
relations decomposed into monadic (country-speciﬁc) and dyadic
(networking) components. By plotting these over the period 1995–
2011, we can observe changes in the trade ﬂows and bilateral
relations over time. For simplicity trade and dyads obtained only
by DVLS estimator and using France and Germany as reference
importer and export respectively are reported. We ﬁnd that in 17
years of independence each CAC improved its trade with all
countries in the pool (37 countries including intra-trade) and
country-speciﬁc and networking factors increased their inﬂuence.
The changes vary from country pair to country pair though, but it is
still feasible to categorise results into two groups as follows.
4.2.1. Monadic-driven bilateral trade
In this group of country pairs, a gap appears between trade ﬂow
and bilateral trade component (dyad) which becomes wider over
time. This happens because the slope of growing trade ﬂows is
greater than that of the dyadic component. 136 country-pair
relationships (or about 75% of all bilateral trade) fall into this
category. The example of country-pair trade dominated by
monadic factors is shown in Fig. 2 (plot 1).
4.2.2. Dyadic-driven bilateral trade
In this group of country pairs trade is increasing at the same rate
as dyadic costs do while monadic component is constant over time.
49 (or about 25%) country-pair relationships fall into this category.
The example of dyadic driven country-pair trade is shown in Fig. 2
(plot 2).
The aggregate dyadic and monadic component shares in
bilateral trade of each CAC are reported in Table 7 and show
remarkable heterogeneity in trade behaviour. Detailed information
on all 185 country pairs is reported in Mazhikeyev, Edwards, and
Rizov (2014). Comparing our estimates of dyads (networking
effects) with results from the alternative method offered in Novy
(2013), which assumes trade elasticity equal to 8, produced similar
Fig. 2. Illustrative examples of Monadic-driven and Dyadic-driven trade.
Table 7
Summary of dyadic and monadic driven trade.
Country pair trade of Dyadic driven (%) Monadic driven (%)
Kazakhstan 58 42
Kyrgyzstan 50 50
Tajikistan 8 92
Turkmenistan 4 96
Uzbekistan 4 96
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similarity conﬁrms that tetrading can be successfully employed for
decomposition analysis in the case of CACs.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Our study conﬁrms the four hypotheses set out in Section 2.
First of all, while all CACs have experienced growing trade since the
end of the 1998 Russian crisis, this does not mean that the
countries are homogeneous. In fact, while they share aspects of
culture, history and landlockedness, the CACs show considerablevariety in initial conditions (size, population, resource base,
specialisation). Moreover, in terms of transitional reforms, there
is a considerable divergence between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,
in the reformist camp, and the other CACs. Reform in terms of trade
tends to be strongly correlated with other transitional reforms
such as privatisation and enterprise restructuring linking at
theoretical level to the liability of localness concept that we tried
to utilise in explaining the micro (ﬁrm) level drives of trade
performance.
Secondly, we note that trade has grown considerably in all
countries, reﬂecting the rise in Russian and regional incomes
(following stabilisation and oil/gas price recovery). Oil and gas
exporters have particularly beneﬁted. However, the evidence is
that the more isolationist states have simply relied on these,
possibly fortuitous factors to boost their trade, whereas the more
reform-minded states have achieved considerable trade growth
through reducing trade costs. Hence, the growth and ﬂuctuations
in trade of the ‘‘more isolationist’’ economies Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are driven by changes over time in
monadic variables (primarily GDP) while trade partnerships of
‘‘more open’’ economies Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are driven
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as monadic variables.
We re-emphasise that our ﬁndings summarised above are
subject to some data limitations and caveats associated with the
estimation methods used. Next we discuss implications of our
results for business strategy and government policy.
5.1. Globalisation vs. regionalisation
In the era of globalisation, countries build more trade
connections that raise income and welfare. However, there are
also some negative implications: not just in terms of trade
diversion where integration is regional, but also in terms of
vulnerability to shocks. For example, during the 1998 Russian crisis
The Euromoney Risk Ranking for Russia went up from 78 (in
December 1997) to 129 (in September 1998). Observing this
situation, Fitch IBCA lowered Russian International Credit Rating
from B+ to CCC. As a result, Russian interest rates increased from
3% to 6%. This had a strong impact upon the CACs, both through
monadic effects (GDP in a major export market reduced), and
through trade costs (since access to ﬁnance is important for trade).
Kazakhstan, with a common border with Russia, was more exposed
than Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and was hit by the crisis harder
(Westin, 1999), although even the isolationist CACs were
dependent on Russia as the primary export market for their gas,
as dictated by pipeline routes. Financial shortages reduced CACs-
Russia trade in both directions by 40%. Furthermore, the debt-to-
GDP ratio, in early 1999, rose more sharply for small open CACs,
Kyrgyzstan (54%) and Tajikistan (90%), and less for large and more
diversiﬁed Kazakhstan (17%) while for isolationist Turkmenistan
(1.7%) and Uzbekistan (4.4%) the effect was negligible (Pastor &
Damjanovic, 2001).
In support of Hypothesis 4 the current fall in the global price of
oil, and the effects of Western sanctions on Russia will have
heterogeneous effects on these countries. Paradoxically, the
countries which have reformed trade more, Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan, are more tied in the short-medium term to ﬂuctua-
tions in the Russian economy, and their currencies are already
showing evidence of spillover of the current Russian crisis.
5.2. Transport links and RTAs
The CACs’ location in the heart of Eurasia is strategically
important but imposes a disadvantage in trade. Overland transport
costs of goods average $1380/1000 km, almost 10 times higher than
by sea ($190/1000 km) raising trade costs by 60% as found by Limao
and Venables (2001). According to the Vinokurov, Dzhadraliyev, and
Shcherbanin (2009) CACs main trade ﬂows go in three main
directions: (i) to Russia and Europe via the Trans-Asian-Railway
(Tashkent/Bishkek–Dushanbe–Almaty–Moscow/Kiev) or TRACECA
(Bishkek–Tashkent–Almaty–Aktau–Baku–Batumi); (ii) to Iran,
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia via the Central-Railway (Almaty/Bish-
kek–Tashkent–Ashkhabat–Turkmenbashi–Tehran–Istanbul); (iii)
to China and Asian-Paciﬁc Region via the East-Trans-Asian-Railway
(Tashkent–Bishkek/Dushanbe–Dostyk–Lianyungang). Leamer and
Levinsohn (1994) rightly assert that ‘‘distance matters and it matters
a lot’’; since 90% of CACs trade is by rail the assertion is particularly
relevant for the CACs case.
Raballand (2003) found that the trade of landlocked Former
Soviet Union countries fell by 80% compared to coastal ones during
1995–1999. Landlocked CACs had to negotiate with bordering
coastal states, as well as other landlocked states controlling routes
(Grigoriou, 2007). For example, Uzbekistan is virtually surrounded
by other landlocked countries. Trade barriers imposed by (coastal)
Russia to landlocked CACs were very high (Djankov & Freud, 2002).
Even though Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan share a borderwith coastal China, trade is impeded by the Himalaya-Tibet massif,
and the only convenient geographic corridor to China is the
Djunghar Gate of Kazakhstan. Note that the infrastructure and rail
roads to China were built during the Soviet era mostly with
strategic considerations (Grigoriou, 2007), and partly reﬂect poor
Soviet-Chinese relations since the late 1950s. Furthermore, Pitt-
man (2013) ﬁnds that reforms to the monopolistic freight railways
in the Former Soviet Union have slowed to a halt over time, and
that even the more reform-minded countries (the Baltics, Russia
and Kazakhstan) have not followed the path of Western railway
modernisation.
While our study ﬁnds RTA membership to be only weakly
economically signiﬁcant, RTAs potentially allow CACs to lessen
transport and transit costs as well as to improve regional transport
infrastructure and create transport corridors. However, the
complexity of regional trade partnerships often creates additional
obstacles. Moreover, most of the regional RTAs have had relatively
little practical importance (Acharya, Crawford, Maliszewska, &
Renard, 2011). The major exception is the Eurasian Custom Union
(EACU) which uniﬁes the external tariffs of Kazakhstan, Russia and
Belarus. Magilevskii (2012) demonstrates the EACU effect by
pointing out that the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and
Russia increased by 28% between 2010 and 2011, while for the
same period growth rate of trade between the Customs Union of
Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation and the other CACs
is 19%. Kyrgyzstan is likely to join the EACU next year and
Tajikistan is currently negotiating its membership. However,
Kassenova (2012) reports that despite the EACU formation,
Kazakhstan still faces high Russian NTBs. Furthermore, there are
serious questions outstanding, especially for those CACs reluctant
to reform, like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, who are not showing
any sign of interest in the EACU.
5.3. Other important factors of trade
Other factors of importance are the conditions of access and use
of CACs’ transport infrastructure (Grigoriou, 2007), CACs access to
sea ports (Kulipanova, 2012), transit systems in the region
(Raballand, 2003). Trade barriers, indeed, are reaching beyond
the transport and border costs, and as mentioned in Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2004) also include policy costs (tariff and non-tariff
like quotas), cost of information and currency exchange, ﬁnance,
distribution costs and trade costs associated with unobservable
barriers linked to cultural and historic ties. Indeed, trade costs as
estimated in our gravity formulation will include any costs of
business regulation and corruption. Evans (1999) suggest that
political systems, differences in education, production, market and
industrial structure should be considered as primary factors of
trade. Dow and Karunaratna (2006) examine 37 different studies to
identify main ‘psychic’ distance factors. They ﬁnd that culture,
language, education level, religion, time zone, industrial develop-
ment, and political systems are most common factors used in trade
studies. Of these factors, the latter two are likely to be most
relevant for the CACs. Inherited from Soviet days the main
industries and infrastructure in CACs are quite outdated, but the
energy rich CACs (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan)
using oil and gas revenues have been able to modernise their
industries, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan developed their
agrarian sectors. Regarding the political system, the IMF (2012)
ﬁnds that relatively liberal (more accurately less authoritarian)
political systems (like in Kyrgyzstan, compared to Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan) are linked to less restrictive trade regimes.
To conclude: we ﬁnd a relationship between being an open/
isolationist country and having dyadic/monadic driven trade with
other countries. Open CACs’ (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) trade
performance is mostly explained by time varying bilateral factors
A. Mazhikeyev et al. / International Business Review 24 (2015) 935–947946while the trade performance of isolationist CACs (Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) is affected mostly by country-
speciﬁc properties. The IB literature on liability of localness versus
foreignness has particular relevance to CACs, because of their past
Soviet ties. Under the Soviet system, trade and other economic
reforms which would place local enterprises at a liability, were
avoided. The price was greatly reduced incentive to innovate or to
develop products saleable on world markets. Our hypotheses and
gravity evidence show that those CACs which are now reforming
are achieving an increasing ability to export to markets more
widely than simply the former Soviet countries, even though
Russia remains the primary trade partner in many cases. A possible
implication is that, at least in industries where Russian businesses
themselves have reformed, the process of integration into an
Eurasian bloc may not necessarily be damaging to export
performance with the rest of the world. However, some countries
may fear loss of sovereignty (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2013) or look
for alternative alliances to the East or the South. Clearly, the
ongoing CACs integration processes and their international
business implications present an interesting case for future
research.
Appendix. Main Central Asia RTAs (in chronological order)
 1991—Central Asian Commonwealth (CAC) with ﬁve members
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan) was established; the organisation merged with the EurAsEC
in 2006.
 1994—Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Agree-
ment (CISFTA) was created covering all the CIS countries,
although by 2009, only eight of its members (Kazakhstan,
Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Moldova, and
Ukraine) remained, with the other CIS countries (Azerbaijan,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) becoming observers.
 1996—Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was estab-
lished by Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. In 2001, these three
countries as well as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a treaty to
organise a common system of water and energy use. Uzbekistan
withdrew from the organisation.
 1996—Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed
among China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and
further in 2001 Uzbekistan joined the group as well.
 1998—Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan joined the WTO (as did Russia in
2012).
 2010—Eurasian Customs Union (EACU) was established between
Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus, which is intended to be the ﬁrst
step towards forming ‘‘Common Economic Space’’, a common
supranational system of trade and tariffs connecting all CIS
countries.
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